Twelve years ago, Brian Powell and Lala Carr Steelman analyzed state SAT scores in a landmark article in the Harvard Educational Review. At the time, politicians and the media, among others, had been using raw state SAT scores to make inferences about the relative quality of education among the U.S. states. Powell and Steelman, however, found that more than 80 percent of the variation in average state SAT scores could be attributed to the percentage of students in a state taking the test -in other words, in states where the percentage of students taking the SAT was low, state SAT averages tended to be high because that test-taking population included a high proportion of high-achieving students, Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildering: The Use and Misuse... http://www.edreview.org/harvard96/1996/sp96/p96powel.htm 2 of 38 2/9/2007 9:11 AM and vice-versa. Since the percentage of students taking the SAT was not necessarily linked to the quality of education in a given state, Powell and Steelman cautioned against using unadjusted state SAT averages to evaluate educational quality.
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In this article, Powell and Steelman revisit the subject of state SAT scores, providing an update on how state SAT scores continue to be used and misused in public deliberation over the last decade, reanalyzing interstate variation in SAT scores using contemporary data, and extending their analysis to investigate variation among state ACT scores. Powell and Steelman conclude by reaffirming their earlier position that state rankings based on SAT scores change dramatically once they have been adjusted for factors such as the participation rate or the class rank of the student test-taking population. In addition, despite the claims of some researchers and policymakers that money does not make much difference in terms of student achievement, Powell and Steelman find that public expenditures are positively related to state Over a decade ago, we (Powell & Steelman, 1984) were the first to publish a major analysis of factors linked to interstate variation in Scholastic Assessment (formerly Aptitude) Test (SAT) performance.
1 Using previously unreleased and unexamined state data on SAT scores provided by the College Board, we analyzed state and regional differences in SAT scores as a function of several compositional and structural variables. Among our major conclusions were:
1. The preponderance of variation -over 80 percent -in state SAT averages is attributable to the participation rate (i.e., the percent of students in each state taking the SAT).
unadjusted SAT rankings of states should not be used to gauge the quality of state educational systems. Second, we probe how state SAT rankings have been employed in the interim (i.e., since 1984) to steer social policy and stoke political fires. Third, we reanalyze the issue using contemporary state SAT data and other refinements. Fourth, we analyze data examining state rankings with respect to performance on another widely used standardized test, the American College Test (ACT).
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Background
Standardized test scores and their implications undeniably rivet national attention. The debate over standardized testing, reignited recently by Hernnstein and Murray's (1994) The Bell Curve and critical responses to it (Gould, 1994) , illustrates the deep degree to which this issue is embedded in the United States's national psyche. The low and stagnant national SAT performance continues to fuel concern in academic and public circles.
Similarly, the quality of U.S. education relative to other countries, based again on standardized test results, alarms many observers of the educational scene (Gerstner, 1994) .
Critics paint an almost apocalyptic picture of the educational system, using adjectives like "grim," "disheartening," "dismal," and "deplorable" (Camper, 1989; Jordan & Thompson, 1993; Kaplan, Wingert, & Chideya, 1993; Lindsay, 1994) , whereas others (Bracey, 1994; Rothstein, 1993) argue that such depictions are overbblown. Although some commentators have accentuated the limitations of standardized tests and questioned their validity (Crouse & Trusheim, 1989; Slack & Porter, 1980) , it is unlikely that these tests will be abandoned as evaluative tools. Consequently, even skeptics cannot dismiss the ongoing ramifications of standardized tests.
In this negative climate, states have come under siege. Insofar as states, in partnership with communities, largely govern educational systems -with current proposals at the national level geared to decentralize federal intervention in education even further -state comparisons are employed frequently by policymakers, pundits, the press, and academics to determine which educational systems fail and why they do so. State SAT averages are often used to make such assessments.
Over ten years ago, we (Powell & Steelman, 1984) challenged the wisdom of using raw (i.e., unadjusted) state SAT averages as a yardstick to evaluate the performance of educational systems. Could we realistically expect crude SAT rankings to provide such remarkable insight? And, indeed, a spate of subsequent publications reached similar conclusions, albeit with different twists (Koretz, 1992; Page & Feifs, 1985; Wainer, 1986) .
Although our study demonstrated the folly of ranking states by raw SAT averages, the rankings continue to be disseminated to the public unapologetically year after year. We see this policy as one of three possible responses to the criticisms we and others raised about this misuse of state SAT averages.
Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildering: The Use and Misuse... http://www.edreview.org/harvard96/1996/sp96/p96powel.htm 4 of 38 2/9/2007 9:11 AM First, the College Board, the national organization under which the SAT program is administered, simply could have reversed its policy of making annually awaited announcements of state rankings. Indeed, such an about-face would have affirmed the College Board's original reservations about publishing the state-by-state breakdown. Until the early 1980s, the College Board hesitated to release this information in large measure because officials there understood that state comparisons could not be judiciously rendered without respect to many factors that clouded the issue. For instance, the participation rate (i.e., the percentage of high school seniors taking the SAT) accounts for the lion's shareover 80 percent -of the variance in state scores; that is, states in which a small percentage of students take the test tend to have high average SAT scores (Powell & Steelman, 1984 .
A second reaction to the state SAT rankings might have been insistence upon recognizing and accounting for contaminating factors such as participation rate before disseminating such information. Indeed, the College Board warns against using unadjusted SAT scores to make generalizations about state educational systems. Correction for the most glaring confounding variables seems sensible, but has not been pursued aggressively. State SAT scores have been used less often for decisionmaking about educational reform within states than for making distinctions, sometimes invidious, among states. While not the specific focus of this article, comparisons of SAT scores within states to make judgments about how local school districts fare also are in vogue and fall prey to the same kinds of difficulties that state comparisons encounter.
It is disappointing that the third option of simply offering the raw scores for public consumption continues unabashedly, given the controversy and the nearly unanimous consensus among those who scrutinize these rankings thoughtfully that unadjusted SAT scores and ranks are either misleading or meaningless. The ramifications of this practice extend far beyond the yearly promenade of state scores into political and policy realms where they might not justifiably belong. At best, blind acknowledgment of state SAT ranks represents messy scholarship. At worst, state SAT ranks may be used unwisely to guide public policy.
Failure to attend critically to these scores and what they mean runs rampant in the media, among politicians, and, most consequentially, in policymaking. The press often handles SAT scores naively by simply publicizing the ranks but failing to impress upon readers the pitfalls of comparing state SAT averages, or by burying this discussion far beneath the headlines. Perhaps owing to their elegant simplicity and to the public's hunger for ratings of all kinds from football teams to television shows, the ranks have assumed a life of their own. The problem of reification -that is, when the rank becomes synonymous with what it purportedly measures -becomes a threatening possibility. A state's educational system may become judged by its SAT rank, regardless of whether any meaning exists behind the number. Accepted almost without challenge are two assumptions: the SAT measures something real about individuals who take tests, and unadjusted SAT ranks reveal Bewitched, Bothered, Press International, 1984a . Meanwhile, officials from low-scoring states scramble to justify their low rankings. Some, like former Governor James Martin of North Carolina, fretted that the state's low standing would dissuade Japanese companies from doing business with North Carolina (Cash, 1989) . Others downplay the low scores of their states by likening SAT rankings to comparing "apples and oranges" (United Press International, 1987) . Officials and the press in one state often find solace in identifying another state to which it compares favorably, as in the comment, "Thank God for South Carolina" -the state that often "saves" Georgia and other southern states from coming in last place (Hansen, 1992) . Clearly demonstrating the sensitivity of this subject, state officials react with glee if their rank moves even slightly upward, or with gloom if the opposite occurs. The extent to which public officials manipulate the numbers to their own advantage is clearly revealed by the tendency of those in ACT states (i.e., states in which students usually take the ACT instead of the SAT) to rely only on SAT data to appraise state performance. In such cases, as we will demonstrate later, the edge almost always goes to ACT states. Finally, politicians and their supporters use SAT ranks to censure their opponents. In its endorsement of Joseph Pataki for the governorship in New York, for example, the New York Post ("George Pataki for Governor," 1994) cited the state's SAT rank as a reason to oust the incumbent, Mario Cuomo.
State SAT scores sway policy decisions as well. Devising ways to beat the rankings system has become just as common as trying to remedy educational deficits. For example, Indiana's former State School Superintendent, Harold Negley, recommended that fewer students, namely the more academically talented ones, be encouraged to take the SAT (United Press International, 1984b) . He posited that, "The SAT has been a cultural matter in the schools much like wearing a new brand of jeans. It's a peer pressure thing. They find out everybody is taking it so they take it." More recently, legislation was put forth in South Carolina to limit students' eligibility to take the test. Under this proposed legislation, only those students who have taken coursework in algebra and geometry would be eligible Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildering: The Use and Misuse... http://www.edreview.org/harvard96/1996/sp96/p96powel.htm 6 of 38 2/9/2007 9:11 AM to take the examination, thereby reshaping the pool of test-takers to that state's advantage (Sponhour, 1993) . In Dallas, Texas, some school counselors, when distributing packets of information about the SAT, reportedly steer top students toward taking the test while ignoring weaker students (Lewis, 1993 (Rumsey, 1988) . Echoing this assessment, Lauro Cavazos, Bennett's successor, declared, "The deplorable fact [low SATs] further underscores my belief that money alone is not the answer to our education deficit" (Turner, 1989) . From the less conservative side of the political equation, Senator (and sociologist) Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1992) noted in a sarcastic editorial that proximity to Canada boded well for educational systems. He later fell into the trap of concluding that the lower spending states, such as North Dakota, a geographic neighbor of Canada, show that large per-pupil expenditures are not strongly linked to educational success. Many of the views expressed above are provocative because they go beyond the claim that money is unrelated to educational success. Rather, they argue that money is negatively related -that is, that increased funding actually decreases academic performance. Thus, political figures have contributed to mounting conventional wisdom that expenditures for education are wasteful.
Rhetoric surrounding the money issue extends beyond the question of whether expenditures are related to performance. Some advocates of school choice use tally sheets of state ranks to buttress their arguments for providing vouchers to help parents pay for private schools. California's comparatively low state SAT standing was used by school choice advocates as grounds for Proposition 174, which was designed to install a voucher system. Although the proposal failed, the specter that money was being wasted on a weak educational system was successfully raised.
In short, one can see that state SAT rankings may be more influential than appears at first glance. Yet if raw state data yield ill-conceived policy, then such data should be viewed with skepticism. The profound influence that these scores have -on policy and on views regarding education -requires that we take a second look at whether we can adjust SAT scores for factors such as participation rate and student demographics in order to make the scores reflect a more accurate picture of variation in state performance.
Adjusting State SAT Scores
In assessing state SAT scores, one should take into account several selection factors that may influence state performance.
Participation Rate
In 1993, the percentage of eligible students taking the SAT across states spanned the spectrum from a low of 4 percent (in Utah and Mississippi) to a high of 88 percent (in Connecticut). In our earlier work (Powell & Steelman, 1984) , we contended that this factor alone accounts for over 80 percent of the difference across states in average SAT scores. The reason is simple. In states where the percentage of students taking the SAT is high, the proportion of less motivated or low-achieving students taking the test is also high, thus yielding a lower average state SAT score than in those states where the percentage of students taking the exam is low and, consequently, proportionately more high-achieving students take the test.
In this article, we examine whether participation rate continues to affect state SAT scores in the same way it did over a decade ago. In addition, we consider several alternative non-linear transformations of the participation rate variable, such as those suggested by Edwards and Cummings (1989) . We also follow Wainer's (1986) suggestion to look directly at the average class ranking of the students taking the SAT to capture the talent level of the test-taking population of each state.
3 As we will demonstrate, participation rate and class ranking can be used virtually interchangeably in examining SAT scores; interestingly, the same cannot be said for state ACT scores.
Demographic/Compositional Factors
Can state SAT scores be compared without also taking into account compositional variables, besides participation rate, that may affect scores? In our prior work (Powell & Steelman, 1984) test-taking performance range from cultural biases in test construction and content, to biological and genetic bases, to environmental roots. The reasons for these score differentials are complex and continue to be hotly debated; for the purposes of this study, we note that compositional features of the test-taking pool may alter state SAT averages.
In this article, we ask whether these patterns persist into the 1990s. We also add two refinements to our earlier work. First, we include parental education in our models. In contrast to its practice in the early dissemination of state SAT reports, the College Board now provides information on the average educational level of the test-takers' parents. We contend that parental educational level should be taken into account if we are to partition the effects of home versus school on state SAT scores. Second, rather than using a dichotomous measure that differentiates only between African Americans and non-African Americans, we employ a measure of racial composition that also considers the influence of the percentage of Latinos and Asian Americans taking the SAT.
Examining the Effects of Expenditures on State SAT Scores
In our earlier work, we observed that once compositional variables are taken into consideration (in multivariate regression models), the relationship between expenditures (i.e., per-student school expenditures) and state SAT scores switches from negative but not statistically significant, to positive and statistically significant. In other words, using raw, unadjusted SAT scores masks the actual relationship between funding and state SAT performance. In this article, we test whether this relationship is robust and ask, does this pattern endure in the 1990s?
We provide several other improvements over our prior models. First, we now consider interstate differences in cost-of-living when estimating the effects of expenditures. As an example, $5,000 in North Dakota does not have the same value as $5,000 in New Jersey. In current models, we adjust state per-student expenditures by the interstate cost-of-living index proposed by Nelson (1991) . Second, we examine whether it is more appropriate to use current or previous per-student expenditures in assessing state SAT scores. The common practice (by the media, by governmental officials, by other researchers, and by our earlier study) is to see if an association exists between expenditures and some educational outcomes from the same year. For example, in its Report Card On American Education -1993, the American Legislative Exchange Council (1993) posited that no relationship existed between state SAT scores for 1993 and per-pupil expenditures from 1993. 4 But when one considers carefully how schooling might influence standardized test performance, it should be evident that previous expenditures (i.e., from several years ago) should be examined in addition to, or in lieu of, current funding. Therefore, in this article, we highlight the relationship between state SAT scores from 1993 and state funding from 1988 (when the students in our analysis were in junior high). In additional analyses, we consider the effect of state expenditures from other years. Third, we consider whether state student-teacher ratios are associated with state SAT scores. We contend that reducing this
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Assessing State Performance on the ACT
Most public debate on state differences in educational performance centers on SAT scores. Scores on the American College Test receive less attention, even though the ACT is accepted by more colleges than the SAT, and students take the ACT more often than the SAT in a majority of states. Indeed, in a computer search of major newspapers, we found that the number of articles referring to the SAT exceeded the number of articles mentioning the ACT by over 400 percent.
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We attribute this discrepancy to several factors. First, more high school students take the SAT than the ACT, although this difference is decreasing (last year 85% as many students took the ACT as took the SAT). 6 Second, the SAT is the more commonly taken exam in eastern and western states, whereas the ACT is more typically taken in midwestern states. Given the concentration of the media in the East (e.g., New York and Washington, DC) and the West (e.g., California), it is not surprising that less publicity has been devoted to ACT scores. Third, in contrast to the College Board's annual public release of state SAT averages, the American College Testing Program's policy has been to keep state ACT scores confidential and to give each state license to publish its scores if its governing body wishes. With permission granted by the American College Testing Program, we have obtained ACT scores and important information on the percentage of students taking the exam, as well as the average class ranking and racial composition of the ACT test-taking populations for each state. 8 Thus, we are able to explore whether the same factors that influence state SAT scores have comparable effects on state ACT scores.
Methodology
As in our original analysis, we extract data provided by the Admissions Testing Program of the College Board -the state-by-state College-Bound Seniors, 1993 reports. These documents provide valuable information on average SAT scores, statistical profiles of the test-taking population for each state, and summaries of student self-reports of academic and financial background. These data allow us to estimate whether the patterns remarked upon over a decade ago still apply today. The means and standard deviations of the key variables we analyzed are displayed in Table 1 . In estimating SAT performance, we examine first the degree to which SAT scores are a function of the percentage of a state's eligible high school seniors who take the exam. We further consider other measures to take into account the selectivity of those taking the exam -such as class ranking (i.e., the percentage of test-takers in the top 10 percent of their graduating class). We then incorporate into our models other compositional variables that may influence SAT scores: parental education (the percentage of test-takers whose parents attended college), racial composition (measured by the percentage of the test-taking population who are African American, Latino, and Asian American, respectively), sex composition (the percentage of test-takers who are female), and familial income (the median familial income, adjusting for interstate variation in the cost-of-living).
Since one of our goals is to explore whether public expenditures are linked to aggregated state test scores, we also evaluate a measure of state public expenditures per student. This information is obtained from the Digest of Educational Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics, 1993) and the Estimates of School Statistics (National Education Association, 1993) . In contrast to our earlier work, however, we have changed this measure in two ways. First, following the recommendation of Nelson (1991) , we now adjust for interstate variation in cost-of-living. Second, we consider the effect of previous funding on SAT scores. Our argument is simple: current expenditures should not immediately influence current test performance (Koretz, 1992) . Rather, the real effect of expenditures may not materialize until several years later. Thus, while in supplementary analysis we regressed SAT scores on expenditures from the current year, our focus in this study is on past funding -in this case, from 1988, when the students in our study were in junior high school. In other analyses in this article, we explore the effect of expenditures from several individual years and from blocks of years.
Caution should be exercised, of course, when using state indicators in any analysis. We recognize that within any state, the per-pupil expenditures may vary considerably. Moreover, our data pertain to only a portion of school students, whereas the measure of expenditures we use includes all students, whether or not they are seniors and have taken college entrance exams. Despite these problems, state data are important, especially given 2/9/2007 9:11 AM continuing public interest in state SAT and ACT scores and the repeated use of aggregated state public expenditures by those critiquing the educational system.
Another extension in this article from our previous work is our analysis of the American College Test. Upon request, we were provided state-by-state data on average ACT scores, as well as average class standing and racial composition of each state's ACT test-taking population. These data enable us to ascertain whether the patterns discovered for SAT performance are generalizable to the ACT. As with our analysis of state SAT scores, our models first probe the degree to which ACT scores are a function of the percentage of students taking the exam and/or the class ranking of the test-taking population. We then check for potential effects of public expenditures and consider the implications of racial composition on the ACT scores. Table 2 presents the percentage of high school seniors taking the SAT, the average SAT score, and the ranking for each state in 1993. The relationship between the first two variables is graphically displayed in Figure 1 . The pattern is striking. A remarkably strong negative relationship exists between participation rate and state SAT scores: a high percentage of test-takers in a state is associated with low average state SAT scores. 9 The pattern also seems non-linear -that is, the magnitude of the negative slope is the greatest when differentiating among the lowest participation rates, and decreases until there is virtually no difference between, for example, a 70 percent and a 75 percent participation rate. Table 3 displays regression models in which state SAT scores are estimated by participation rate and other variables. In Model 2 of Table 3 , state SAT means are regressed on participation rate only. Because the pattern in Figure 1 appears non-linear, we considered several non-linear transformations of the participation variable, including parabolic, reciprocal, and logarithmic transformations, as well as an adjustment suggested by Edwards and Cummings (1989) . The non-linear term we used and report here is the same as we used in our previous analyses -both the square root of the percent and the percent of eligible test-takers. It is, however, noteworthy that the basic substantive conclusions of our current article, especially those regarding the connection between expenditures and SAT scores, are quite robust. Indeed, several of the alternative transformations produced even stronger patterns regarding expenditures than those presented here.
Results
Percentage of Test-Takers
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Model 2 (Table 3) suggests that over 85 percent of state variation in SAT scores is attributable to participation rate -a figure slightly higher than the model specified in our original work (82%). 
Class Rank
Some critics recommend that class rank be used in lieu of participation rate (Wainer, 1986) . The argument is that participation rate is so strongly related to state SAT scores because it is a proxy for academic promise/achievement. Using that logic, it makes as much, if not more, sense to use the average academic performance of the test-taking population instead of participation rate. Fortunately, the data from the College Board contain information on self-reported class ranking. 12 Figure 2 displays state scores by the percentage of the test-takers who report being in the top 10 percent of their class. 13 Again, the pattern is starkly apparent. Higher percentages of students in the top 10 percent of their class are associated with higher average state SAT scores. The pattern is linear, as confirmed in exploratory regression analysis using various non-linear transformation of the variables. Table 4 summarizes the regression models estimating SAT scores using class rank as the key explanatory variable. The regression coefficient in Model 2 indicates that for each additional percentage point of students who report being in the top 10 percent of their class, there is approximately a six-point increase in state SAT scores. This model is nearly as effective in explaining SAT scores as the participation rate model (Model 2) in Table 3 . Over 83 percent of the variation in state SAT scores can be directly linked to class standing. 
Adjusted State Rankings
Once participation rate or class rank is taken into account, the relative order of states shifts dramatically. Column 4 of Table 2 , "Expected SAT Score," provides the estimated scores of each state derived from the aforementioned fitted non-linear regression model (Model 2) from Table 3 . For example, based on the fitted regression model, we should expect an 2/9/2007 9:11 AM SAT score of 1020 for Alabama (column 4 of Table 2 ), in which 9 percent of its seniors took the exam (column 1 of Table 2 ). However, its average score of 1006 (column 2 of Table 2 ) is 14 points below its expected score (column 5 of Table 2 ). In contrast,
Maryland's SAT score (909) exceeds its expected score (889) by 20 points.
The residuals for each state (i.e., the difference between actual and expected scores) are listed in column 5 of Table 2 
Figure 1 Coming Soon
An inspection of the states with the largest negative residual scores and the worst rankings indicates that southern states continue to exhibit a disadvantage. 15 In contrast to our previous work, however, the South/non-South gap in average state SAT scores does not appear until participation rate is considered. That is, whereas in our past analysis of 1982 data we found a 34-point difference (significant at the .01 level) between southern and non-southern states on unadjusted SAT scores, the corresponding difference using 1993 data is 15 points and not statistically significant at the .05 level. When participation rate, however, is inserted into the model, the regional difference in 1993 increases to 32 points (significant at the .01 level). Although this gap is less than that found in comparable models from 1982 (approximately 46 points), the key point is that the South/non-South gap, although less than in 1982, remains. Reliance on unadjusted SAT scores would give a false sense of the degree of improvement by southern states. 
Figure 2 Coming Soon
Of course, the rankings from Table 2 represent only one way to order states. One can arrive at a slightly different rank ordering depending on the control variables used, such as class standing, although our supplementary analyses revealed a great deal of consistency 2/9/2007 9:11 AM in the rankings from models controlling for selectivity. Thus, we do not mean to imply that these state rankings are definitive. Rather, they are better indicators of states' real SAT performance than the uncorrected ones typically used by the media and others. 
The Effect of Expenditures
More importantly, once selectivity of the test-taking population (e.g., participation rate or class rank) is added to the regression model, expenditures are strongly linked to SAT scores. As mentioned earlier, expenditures can be measured in several ways. In the models presented in Tables 3 and 4 , we use the per-student school expenditures in 1988, adjusting for state variation in cost-of-living. Many commentators have written about the seeming nonexistent or, in some cases, negative relationship between expenditures and state SAT scores. The negative (although statistically insignificant) regression coefficient from Model 1 of Tables 3 and 4 appears to confirm these speculations. This pattern is reversed, however, once percent participation (Model 3 of Table 3 ) or class ranking (Model 3 of Table 4 ) is taken into account. In other words, these corrected models disclose a strong positive relationship between expenditures and SAT scores. From Model 3 of Table 3 , we see that once participation rate is included in the regression model, each additional $1,000 per student translates into approximately an additional 14.8 points on state SAT scores. The corresponding coefficient from Table 4 is lower (11.0), but it, too, is statistically significant. *p is less than or equal to 0.05 **p is less than or equal to 0.01 Notes: "CPI" represents Consumer Price Index. N=50
The positive link between funding and SAT scores is robust. Use of alternative measures (including grade point average) and transformations of the participation rate in our models yield the same conclusion. While corrected rankings of states vary somewhat, the overall positive relationship between SAT scores and expenditures remains steady.
As noted earlier, when considering the effects of expenditures on educational outcomes, it may be more appropriate to use expenditures from several years prior to testing, or the average of expenditures for several years, rather than recent expenditures. Table 5 presents the partial correlations of expenditures from 1984 through 1993 and SAT scores, controlling for participation rate. As indicated in the first column, which lists per-capita expenditures that are not adjusted for interstate variation in cost-of-living, the correlation, although statistically significant for each year, generally increases through the late 1980s
and then decreases. 16 The same pattern holds, although the correlations are generally higher, if adjustments for cost-of-living (column 2) and logarithmic transformations of expenditures (column 3) are used. Moreover, collapsing these years into blocks that roughly approximate high school years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , middle school years (1987) (1988) (1989) , and late elementary school years (1984) (1985) (1986) ) of the student test-taking population in this study illustrates the potentially greater implications of school funding during middle school years; the partial correlation for the middle school years is higher than high school and late elementary school years in all three columns of Table 5 . The correlation of SAT scores and average expenditures for the period representing the test-takers' school career (from 1981 through 1993) also is strong (.358 for unadjusted expenditures, .382 for expenditures adjusted for interstate variation in cost-of-living, and .416 for the log of expenditures).
Other Compositional Factors
In earlier work, we found that participation rate was not the only compositional/selectivity factor correlated with SAT scores. In this article, we explore the effect of the compositional variables we used previously and add an extra one -parental education. Model 4 in Tables 3 and 4 reveals that parental education, measured here as the percentage of test-takers in a state whose parents attended college, is highly associated with SAT scores even after controlling for participation rate and expenditures (Table 3) or class rank and expenditures (Table 4) . Indeed, with the exception of participation rate/class ranking, parental education is the most powerful compositional factor (i.e., compared with sex, race, and familial income) in estimating SAT scores. After parental education is added, the effect of expenditures remains significant. The percentage of African Americans among the test-takers is also strongly, but negatively, associated with SAT scores, and its inclusion decreases the effects of expenditures (Model 5, Tables 3 and 4 ). The effects of the percentage of Latino and Asian Americans are neither as strong nor as consistent as 2/9/2007 9:11 AM the effects of the percentage of African Americans (reflecting the pattern that the average SAT scores for Latino and Asian American students are closer to the scores of White students), and these additions do not have a discernible effect on the expenditures coefficient (Model 6, Tables 3 and 4) . 17 In contrast to our prior work, the effects of median income and sex composition are not statistically significant. 18 Moreover, the inclusion of these variables does not change noticeably the effect of expenditures (Model 7, Tables 3 and 4) . 19 It appears that if we want to adjust beyond participation rate, and there certainly may be questions as to how far one really should adjust scores, a point we return to later, the most parsimonious model would also adjust for parental education and percentage of African Americans.
We estimated the residuals based on each model mentioned above. Certainly, the state rankings change based on these residuals, and some states fluctuate considerably more than others; certain states consistently rate towards the top, however, while others tend downwards. For example, in the model that includes expenditures, parental education, percentage African American, and participation rate (Model 5, The South's apparent disadvantage on the SAT relative to non-southern states is attributable in part to expenditures. As mentioned above, southern differences in SAT scores are statistically significant if one examines scores controlling for participation rate. While much of this difference is associated with compositional factors such as parental education and race, the South/non-South difference disappears only upon the additional inclusion of expenditures (a difference of 10.5 points, but not statistically significant). Thus, while several southern states have made impressive efforts in the past few years to boost funding to schools, positive dividends of these changes may not be realized for several years.
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The Influence of Student-Teacher Ratios Although it is beyond the scope of this article to identify the mechanisms by which expenditures influence SAT scores, we explored two possibilities: teacher salaries and student-teacher ratios. The first did not prove fruitful: the effects of teacher salaries, although generally positive, were not consistent enough to draw any firm conclusions. In contrast, the effects of student-teacher ratio were more consistent. Table 6 presents four models using student-teacher ratios from 1988 (again using the same premise that we presented earlier on expenditures). We present what we consider the most parsimonious model -with participation rate (or class ranking) and parental education and percentage African American in addition to student-teacher ratio (Models 1 and 3) -and the full model (Models 2 and 4), which includes the other compositional variables discussed earlier.
In each model, student-teacher ratio is negatively correlated with SAT scores -that is, larger classes are associated with lower SAT scores.
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Figure 3 Coming Soon
ACT Scores
In examining ACT scores, we find some commonalities between the patterns for ACT and SAT scores, but some differences as well. The first departure occurs in the relationship between ACT scores and participation rate. Recall that we found a very strong negative, non-linear relationship between state SAT scores and the percentage of eligible students taking the exam. For ACT scores, however, the negative relationship is weaker, as suggested in Figure 3 . Indeed, in regression models in which the percentage of test-takers is used to estimate ACT scores (Model 3, Table 7 ), the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, but not nearly as profound as in the regression models predicting SAT score: only 6 percent of the variance in ACT score was explained by percentage of test-takers, as compared with 85 percent of the variance in SAT score. Tests incorporating non-linear relationships of these two variables (e.g., square root of percentage) showed no significant improvement in fit.
How can we explain this finding? We contend that the motivation to take the ACT and SAT varies considerably. Those taking the SAT plan to apply to schools in states in which the SAT is the predominant exam, mostly in the East and West. While prominent colleges and universities certainly exist in the ACT states, the Ivy League schools and other prestigious schools are located among the SAT states and more typically expect SAT scores in the application files. Therefore, one should expect a very strong relationship between test scores and the percentage of students taking the SAT because those who take the SAT in ACT states are likely to be highly motivated and high-achieving students.
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Also, we find that for the SAT, a nearly perfect relationship exists between perceived class ranking and percentage taking the exam (-.932, and -.971 if one uses a multiple correlation of class rank with percentage and the square root of percentage).
While the few students taking the SAT in ACT states tend to come from the upper echelon of students, the same cannot be said of the few students taking the ACT in SAT states. Indeed, the rationale for those taking the ACT in non-ACT states is perhaps more idiosyncratic or less grounded in academics. Thus, the relationship between the percentage of students taking the ACT and class ranking should not be as strong. Whereas participation rate can be used interchangeably with class ranking when assessing state SAT data, participation rate is not as markedly linked to class ranking for the ACT.
Fortunately, we were able to obtain information on the self-reported class ranking of students taking the ACT. When completing the application to take the ACT, students were asked to identify the quartile in their graduating class to which they belonged. The correlation between class ranking and percent participation (-.332), while significant, is not sufficiently strong as to suggest a near one-to-one correspondence or the capability for one to serve as a proxy for the other. As Figure 4 illustrates, however, we see a strong relationship between class rank and ACT scores, although this relationship, too, is not quite as potent as the relationship between class rank and SAT scores.
In Model 2 of Table 7 , we find that 38.7 percent of the variation (equivalent to a correlation of .622) in ACT scores can be explained by class rank. Thus, less state variation in ACT performance than in SAT performance is a direct function of the percentage or ranking of students taking the exam.
26, 27, 28 The second, and perhaps more important, difference between the patterns for state SAT and ACT scores is that public expenditures are statistically significant and positively related to unadjusted state ACT scores (i.e., not controlling for other variables such as participation rate or class rank). As indicated in Model 1 of Table 7 , each additional $1,000 per child is associated with an additional .48 points on the ACT. The correlation between these variables is .465, a relationship that is as strong as, if not stronger than, the link between expenditures and other educational outcomes (e.g., NAEP scores). In other words, while others have commented extensively on the negative relationship between school funding and unadjusted state SAT scores, they have ignored (in part for reasons mentioned earlier) compelling evidence of a positive link between funding and unadjusted state ACT scores.
While the connection between expenditures and SAT scores strengthens upon controls for participation rate or class ranking, the opposite occurs for ACT scores. In Model 4 of Table 7 , ACT scores are regressed on class rank and expenditures, and the effect of expenditures is reduced by approximately 30 percent from Model 1 of Table 7 , but remains statistically significant. With respect to racial composition, the percentage of African Americans is statistically significant and negatively associated with ACT scores (Model 5, Table 7 ) as is, in contrast to the SAT models, the percentage of Latinos (Model 6, Table 7 ). The inclusion of race further reduces, but not to non-significance, the effect of expenditures controlling for class rank.
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As for regional differences, unadjusted ACT scores, in contrast to unadjusted SAT scores, are higher for non-southern than for southern states (a statistically significant difference of 1.34 points). This difference is reduced upon controlling for class rank to 1.06 points, further reduced upon controlling for race/ethnicity to .59 points, and reduced to the point of marginal statistical significance of .46 points with the inclusion of expenditures. And the patterns regarding student-teacher ratio for state ACT scores are not consistent with the effects of student-teacher ratios on state SAT scores -they fluctuate from negative and statistically significant to negative but not statistically significant. The same general pattern regarding year of expenditures as found for SAT scores (i.e., that expenditures from the test-takers' middle school years are more highly correlated with test scores than are expenditures from other years) holds in our analysis of ACT scores. In other words, while there are some differences between our models using state ACT and SAT scores, these models have a pivotal finding in common: adjusted state scores are positively and significantly related to state expenditures in education.
Conclusion
Over a decade has passed since we initially alerted scholars, policymakers, and the public to the problems inherent in unadjusted state SAT scores and rankings. Yet these scores still too often are taken at face value. We do not contend that our analysis produces the definitive way to rank-order states; however, whether we rely upon the percentage of 2/9/2007 9:11 AM eligible test-takers or class ranking, when examining state SAT scores, we should, at the very least, adjust for the vast variation between states in the different groups of students taking the test. Whether we should go beyond correcting for ability (via class rank or participation rate) -and, if so, to what extent other between-state differences should be included -is unclear. Some would argue that correcting for ability alone is sufficient. Others might prefer to take into account additional compositional factors of the test-taking population. Our results are somewhat inconsistent regarding the latter position, as we show that racial composition and parental education are strongly associated with state SAT scores; the sex composition and familial income effects we found in our previous work, however, did not materialize in our analyses in this article.
Regardless of the route chosen to adjust state SAT scores, we inevitably arrive at two destinations. First, states undergo marked realignment in their rankings once selection factors (e.g., participation rate and class rank) are incorporated. Second, and more importantly, contrary to prevailing opinion, public expenditures are positively related to state performance. Our interest here lies less in state rankings, or in perfecting them, than in the expenditures issue. Indeed, the goal of making an incontestable rank-ordering between states may prove to be untenable. Rather, in line with recommendations set forth by Lehnen (1992) , we believe the best hope is to produce a set of rankings for each state that falls into an estimated range. It is important to stress that regardless of the adjusted schema chosen, we observe repeatedly that expenditures are linked positively to state SAT scores, with correlations between the two generally falling in the range between .3 and .4. These effects are as strong as, if not stronger than, the effects we documented over a decade ago.
These findings are quite robust. Indeed, the positive link between expenditures and state SAT scores persists across a number of conditions. First, consider that the various measures explored (i.e., simple per-capita expenditures, expenditures adjusted for cost-of-living, and a logarithmic transformation of expenditures) yield statistically significant results. Second, measuring expenditures by individual years or by blocks of years also produces statistically significant results. So too do the various timing measures of expenditures, although investments during the middle school years appear to have the most pronounced impact.
This pattern extends to other standardized tests as well. State ACT scores, which virtually have been ignored in public discourse, exhibit a strong positive association with financial investments. It is intriguing that the relationship between expenditures and state ACT performance unfolds even before selection factors are entered into the picture.
Girding further the favorable influence of expenditures, it is notable that the association between state expenditures and SAT/ACT scores mirrors that which can be found when assessing other indicators of educational quality. With respect to policymaking, our results are highly relevant. If political dialogue continues to tilt toward returning more responsibility to the states, then more careful evaluation of state educational performance becomes an imperative. While some may question whether the regression and correlation coefficients between expenditures and educational outcomes reported here are high, these coefficients clearly are sufficient to forestall and raise concern about efforts to deplete investments in education. Our analysis shakes one aspect of the empirical foundation that has underpinned the move to depress educational funding.
Caution also should be exercised by states when using test scores to assess educational performance. Many states, including California, Illinois, and New Jersey, have started using "report cards" of localities to see how districts within states are faring (Banas, 1993; Lait, 1989; Richmond, 1994) . The same perils that erode confidence in interstate comparisons apply to intrastate assessments.
Admittedly, we are ambivalent about using any standardized test to shape social policy. Criticisms about what these exams really tell us about students or education systems are compelling and merit serious thought. Even assessing the scores in a more refined manner, as we have done in this article, potentially adds unwarranted legitimacy to these exams. As much as critics of these exams would like to avoid using these scores altogether, it is unlikely that their wishes will be heeded. To the extent that these scores have been and will continue to be used by others, it is incumbent upon academicians to inform the public about how these scores have been misconstrued and, in turn, how these misinterpretations may have reckless implications for social policy. 2/9/2007 9:11 AM of Asian Americans is positively associated with scores on the math section of the SAT.
18. The effect of median income may have been reduced by the inclusion of parental education. Indeed, additional analyses suggest that if parental education were excluded from the model (using percent participation), the coefficient for median income would be 3.092 and significant beyond the .01 level. In other words, approximately 70 percent of the effect of income is attributable to its link to parental education. One should note, however, that the connection between SAT and expenditures is statistically significant regardless of whether income, education, or both are included in the models. We also found that alternative measures of income (e.g., a logarithmic transformation) did not change the significance levels of the key variables.
The discrepancy between the effect of sex composition in this model and the models from our previous work is harder to explain. Indeed, supplementary analyses of SAT scores from other years point to instability in the sex composition effects. In some cases it is statistically significant and in others it is not.
19. The effect of expenditures on math SAT scores is stronger and more consistent than that on verbal scores.
20. For several states, considerable variation exists not only within a year (i.e., based on the model used), but also over time. For example, in our previous study, North Dakota's rank in models controlling for participation rate, sex, race, and income was considerably lower than any ranking for North Dakota based on 1993 data. Similarly, Utah's rating experienced some variability. We found in supplementary analyses that pooled scores from several years that North Dakota's score was fairly high (and stabilized) and Utah's rating was lower, but not at the very bottom, as is the case reported in this article.
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. In an auxiliary analysis we explored the influence of outliers, or states that were unusually high in any of the endogenous or exogenous variables. Although the models shift slightly as a result, no major changes in the patterns materialized. We also tested whether the addition of Washington, DC, would markedly alter the patterns presented in this article. Compared to the fifty-state average, Washington, DC, has low SAT scores, high public expenditures, a high participation rate (and correspondingly low class ranking among the test-takers), and a high percentage of minority students in its test-taking pool. In models that include racial composition, the addition of Washington, DC, resulted in slightly higher regression coefficients for expenditures.
22. The South/non-South difference is particularly pronounced on the math sections of the SAT -a finding analogous to our previous work.
23. We considered several variants of the student-teacher ratio measure (e.g., a dichotomy differentiating states with above and below average student-teacher ratios). The patterns from these alternative measures are consistent with those presented in the article. 2/9/2007 9:11 AM 24. Some have suggested that average school (or senior class) size rather than student-teacher ratio may be a pivotal factor in explaining success of state educational systems (Associated Press, 1993; Johnson, 1994; Walberg, 1994) . The SAT data enable us to test this proposition in part. Students taking the SAT were asked to identify the size of their graduating class, and each state College-Bound Seniors booklet provides aggregated data on this item. The booklet also showed the average SAT scores of youths in very small (i.e., less than 100) to very large (i.e., over 1,000) senior classes. While there may be benefits to small schools, we found no empirical support for any advantage with regard to SAT scores. Examining the distribution of SAT scores within each state, we found thirty-five states in which those in the smallest senior classes did not have the highest SAT scores. More telling, however, were regression analyses, similar to those in the main text, comparing states. In these analyses we included a measure of senior class size as an exogenous variable. We fit various models, using all combinations of participation rate, class rank, and other compositional variables. In no case was the class size variable statistically significant; moreover, the regression coefficient for this variable typically was in the opposite direction -that is, senior class size was positively associated with SAT scores. Ironically, many who believe that school size is more important than student-teacher ratio also claim that funding is not associated with SAT scores (and other indicators of educational performance). These two positions seem contradictory: to reorganize our educational system so that we would have smaller schools would require a substantial investment in resources.
25. The College-Bound Seniors booklet for each state lists the forty colleges and universities to which students most frequently requested that their scores be forwarded. As an illustration of the hypothesis that students who take the SAT in ACT states are more likely to apply to prestigious universities, Harvard-Radcliffe was among the top forty institutions for each of the twenty-seven ACT states, but for only seven of the twenty-three SAT states.
26. This finding may explain another pattern we observed: that unadjusted state ACT scores correlate better with other indicators of educational performance than do unadjusted state SAT scores. For example, the correlation between unadjusted ACT scores and National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores is .747, much higher than the .279 correlation between unadjusted SAT scores and NAEP scores. In addition, while the correlation between unadjusted state SAT and ACT scores is virtually zero (.018), the correlation increases to .623 when adjusted scores for both are used.
27. Adjusting for selectivity (via controls for participation rate or class rank) also eliminates the noticeably higher levels of interstate variation in SAT scores than in ACT scores. Although metrics for the ACT and SAT differ, several scholars have suggested means to equate ACT and SAT scores. Wainer (1986) , for example, recommends a formula in which each additional point on the ACT is approximately equal to forty points 2/9/2007 9:11 AM on the SAT. Houston and Sawyer (1991) offer an alternative ACT/SAT concordance. Converting state ACT scores to an SAT metric (i.e., from 400 to 1600), we end up with a standard deviation of approximately 34 points, which is half the standard deviation of state SAT scores (69 points). Once state SAT and ACT scores are also adjusted for participation rate or class rank, however, the interstate variation for the exams becomes roughly equivalent (26 points for each).
28. We also considered several non-linear transformations of the class ranking variable -1/(class rank), parabolic terms, square root terms, and logarithmic terms. Because none of these transformations resulted in appreciably greater variation explained, we used the linear model. Nevertheless, we tested these models using non-linear transformations with expenditures and race added. In some cases, the effect of expenditures increases with these alternative measures.
29. In attempting to equate SAT and ACT scores, we used several formulae, including one suggested by Wainer (1986) . Using his concordance scheme, the .334 coefficient for expenditures in Model 4, Table 7 (in which class rank also is included) translates into a 13.4 point difference per $1,000 expenditures -which is within range of the comparable coefficients for SAT models (Model 3, Tables 3 and 4) . And the .205 coefficient in ACT models including race (Model 6, Table 7 ) equates into roughly 8.2 points per $1,000, quite close to the coefficient for parallel models for the SAT (Model 6, Tables 3 and 4).
30. Wainer (1993) warns against the use of the SAT in part because the correlation between state NAEP and SAT scores, which should be quite high given that they ostensibly measure comparable constructs, is statistically significant, but disappointingly low. And he is correct if one relies on the unadjusted versions of SAT scores: the correlation is .279. Of course, his error is that he does not consider adjusted rankings of states. Indeed, the correlation between state SAT and NAEP scores is quite respectable if one uses state SAT scores adjusted for participation rate (.693) or any of the range of corrections available. What then is the use of the SAT if one can rely on NAEP instead? We believe this is the wrong question, as we should rely on multiple, rather than sole, indicators of education performances to test the degree to which patterns generalize. Moreover, each indicator has its limitations. For example, the NAEP is not given in every state, is not administered yearly, and does not have the central prominence that the SAT has.
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